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EvmENCE-WIBETAPPING AND THE CoNGREss-The familiar cry
that "there ought to be a law" is frequently raised concerning the practice which Justice Holmes long ago characterized as "dirty business"1 the tapping of telephone wires. Although existing legislation on both
federal2 and state3 levels deals with interception of telephone messages,
the almost universal conclusion of commentators on the subject has
been that many of the present day statutes are inadequate. It is particularly apparent that the famous section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 has long been i:n,_need of replacement or
thorough revision. The purpose of this comment is to examine the
past and possible future handling of the wiretapping problem by Congress.

I. The Problem in the Supreme Court
Schwartz v. State4 is the most significant recent wiretapping case in
a series of Supreme Court decisions which began in 1928.5 Wiretapping law has developed in such a crazy-quilt pattern that in recent
years various executive departments have simultaneously interpreted
and applied the present federal statute on wiretapping in several different ways. 6 'In terms of favorable and unfavorable treatment, Supreme Court decisions involving wiretapping can be separated into
three periods. From 1928 to 1937 the controlling principles were those
laid down by the majority opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 7 which
held that tapping does not amount to an illegal "search" prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment, and consequently that evidence acquired by
telephone taps was admissible in federal criminal proceedings. The
dissenters (Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and Butler) argued that there
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 at 470, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928).
243 Stat. L. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1946) §605.
3 Statutes are collected in Rosenzweig, "The Law of Wire Tapping," 33 CoRN. L.Q.
73 at 73-75 (1947). See also note 13 to Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 at 479-481, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928), and 1931 survey prepared at the
request of the attorney general, Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in
Executive Departments, 71st Cong., 3d sess., pp. 5-16 (1931).
4 344 U.S. 199, 73 S.Ct. 232 (1952). See also Schwartz v. State, (Tex. Crim. App.
1952) 246 S.W. (2d) 174.
5 A complete analysis of case law on wiretapping up to 1947 may be found in Rosenzweig, "The Law of Wire Tapping," 32 CoRN. L.Q. 514, 33 CoRN. L.Q. 73 (1947).
6 See statement in "Congressional Wiretapping Policy Overdue," 2 STAN. L. REv.
744 at 744 (1950): "The Attorney General believes Section 605 does not prohibit wiretapping; the Acting Secretary of the Treasury states that it does and that no wiretapping
is used in Treasury Department investigations; the Postmaster General declines to comment
because of the pending debates on the matter in Congress." See also criticism of Justice
Department vacillations as to wiretapping policy in Helfeld, "A Study of Justice Department Policies on Wiretapping," 9 LA.w. GUILD REv. 57 (1949).
7 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928).
1
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had been a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and also
that the government should not use evidence obtained by acts violative
of state law. 8 The Olmstead decision was followed in the lower courts.9
The second era of wiretapping jurisprudence was opened in 1937
when the Supreme Court, in the £rst Nardone case,1° interpreted section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 193411 to require the
exclusion of testimony by federal agents in a federal court as to the
contents of an intercepted telephone message, since such testimony
constitutes a "divulgence" of information contrary to the prohibition
of the statute. Two other Supreme Court decisions in this period
indicated a continuing desire to follow in spirit the stirring advice of
the dissenters in the Olmstead case. The second Nardone case,1 2
decided in 1939, extended the prohibition of section 605 to exclude
evidence constituting "fruit of the poison tree" (information obtained
through wiretap leads) from federal court proceedings, and in United
States 11. W eiss1 3 the Court ruled that section 605 prohibits evidence
in federal courts obtained by interception and divulgence of intrastate
messages.
Since 1942, however, Supreme Court decisions have narrowed the
seemingly broad protection granted to defendants by the trend in earlier
interpretations of section 605. Thus the Court has decided that only
parties to the intercepted conversation have a right to object to the
unlawful use of the information,14 that neither section 605 nor the
Fourth Amendment bars evidence obtained by use of a detectaphone15
or radio transmitter concealed on one of two conversants,1 6 and that
section 605 does not operate to exclude evidence from state court proceedings.17 At various times in the latter two stages of this history,
s Holmes in dissent did not deal with the constitutional issue; he thought that the
government should not use evidence which in this case was obtained in violation of a
Washington statute prohibiting wiretapping. The impassioned constitutional argument of
Brandeis sought exclusion of evidence obtained by wiretapping, in accordance with the
doctrine of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914).
9 Cases are collected in Rosenzweig, "The Law of Wiretapping," 32 CoRN. L.Q. 514
at 533, n. 70 (1947).
10 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 58 S.Ct. 275 (1937).
1143 Stat. L. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1946) §605.
12 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266 (1939). This result was
reached on the theory controlling in search and seizure cases, as propounded in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182 (1920).
1a 308 U.S. 321, 60 S.Ct. 269 (1939).
14 Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 62 S.Ct. 1000 (1942).
15 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct. 993 (1942).
16 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952). The Court also ruled
that the practice did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
11 Schwartz v. State, 344 U.S. 199, 73 S.Ct. 232 (1952).
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dissenters have expressed a desire to reconsider the constitutional issue,
uproot the Olmstead decision, and declare wiretapping violative of the
Fourth Amenclment.18

IL Intent and Policy of Congress as to Section 605Meaning of Schwartz v. State

The intention of Congress in enacting section 605 has never been
ascertained with much success. The broad language of the statutory
prohibition-"no person . . . shall intercept any communication . . .
and divulge [its contents] . . . to any person"-appears to ban wiretapping and require exclusion of wiretapping evidence, but these very
matters were seriously disputed in the first Nardone case.19 Nothing
in the debates or committee reports on the Federal Communications
Act of 1934 indicates that a rule of evidence pertaining to wiretapping
was contemplated by the restrictions of this long unnoticed section of
the statute. The committee report on the bill stated simply that section
605 "is based upon Section 27 of the Radio Act and extends it to wire
communications."20 The committee report on section 27 of the Radio
Act of 192721 is not helpful in analyzing the congressional intention
motivating adoption of section 605. The fact that many bills dealing
specifically with wiretapping had been introduced in Congress in the
interval between the Olmstead case in 1928 and the enactment of
section 605 in 193422 seemed to be good support for the argument
pressed in the first Nardone case that legislative history demonstrated
18 A Texas statute involved in Schwartz v. State, 344 U.S. 199, 73 S.Ct. 232 (1952),
which provides that evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States
should be inadmissible in court [Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1948) art. 727a], gave
· Justices Frankfurter, concurring, and Douglas, dissenting, an opportunity to mention the
constitutional point. Justice Douglas was of the opinion that the case should have been
decided on the constitutional issue. Both justices referred to their dissents in On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952), in which they argued for the unconstitutionality of evidence obtained by a concealed walkie-talkie set. A similar opportunity
to overrule Olmstead was rejected by the Court in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 at 135, 62 S.Ct. 993 (1942) (three of the eight participating justices expressed a
willingness to overturn Olmstead).
10 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 58 S.Ct. 275 (1937). See criticism of
the decision in 53 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1940).
20 S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d sess. (1934). The purpose of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was to supersede the Federal Radio Commission Act and to bring
wire and radio communications under the control of the Federal Communications
Commission.
21 H. Rep. No. 404, 69th Cong., 1st sess. (1927).
22 These bills, evidencing protest at the policy established by the Olmstead case,
either prohibited wiretapping or proscribed the use of evidence obtained by tapping. E.g.,
H.R. 4139, H.R. 5416, 71st Cong., 1st sess. (1929); S. 3344, S. 6061, 71st Cong., 3d
sess. (1930); H.R. 23, H.R. 5305, H.R. 9893, S. 1396, 72d Cong., 1st sess. (1931-1932).

1954]

COMMENTS

433

section 605 was not intended to apply to such a practice. The Supreme
Court dismissed this contention, however, with a brisk reference to the
broad language of the statute.23
Another aspect of congressional intention was the decisive issue in
the recent Supreme Court pronouncement on wiretapping, Schwartz
v. State: was section 605 intended to ban wiretapping evidence in state
courts? The Court answered in the negative, thereby affirming previous determinations of the issue by several state courts.24 In support
of the view that the statute applied to state tribunals, it has been argued
that the literal wording of the statute covers any interception and divulgence, whether such "divulgence" occurs in a federal or a state court.
It has been contended that nothing in the statute, nor any policy
consideration, indicates that "no person" was drafted with the intention
of including witnesses in federal but not state courts. The strength of the
statute has been said to be vitiated by inapplicability to state courts, since
it is in the state tribunals that most criminal prosecutions, and hence most
wiretapping questions, arise. On the other hand, the Supreme Court
reasoned in the Schwartz case that there had not been a clear-cut expression of congressional intention to impose rules of evidence on state
courts, and that a statute should not be extended by implication so as
to supersede the exercise of state power. In handing down its first
opinion on the inapplicability of section 605 to state proceedings,2 5 the
23 "True it is that after this court's decision in the Olmstead case Congressional committees investigated the wire-tapping activities of federal agents. Over a period of several
years bills were introduced to prohibit the practice, all of which failed to pass. • . . It is
also true that the committee reports in connection with the Federal Communications Act
dwell upon the fact that the major purpose of the legislation was the transfer of jurisdiction over wire and radio communication to the newly constituted Federal Communications
Commission. But these circumstances are, in our opinion, insufficient to overbear the plain
mandate of the statute." Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 at 382-383, 58 S.Ct.
275 (1937). It might also be pointed out that the two previous statutes which dealt with
wiretapping specifically used the words "wiretap" or "tap." 47 Stat. L. 1381 (1933); 40
Stat. L. 1017 (1918).
24 Bratburd v. State, (Md. 1952) 88 A. (2d) 446; Leon v. State, 180 Md. 279, 23
A. (2d) 706 (1942); Rowan v. State, 175 Md. 547, 3 A. (2d) 753 (1939); Black v.
Impelliterri, 201 Misc. 371, 111 N.Y.S. (2d) 402 (1952); People v. Stemmer, 298 N.Y.
28, 83 N.E. (2d) 141 (1948) (see note 25 infra); Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell,
296 N.Y. 15, 68 N.E. (2d) 854 (1946); People v. Channell, 107 Cal. App. (2d) 192,
236 P. (2d) 654 (1951). Prior to the Channell case the California courts had decided
several cases on the assumption that §605 does apply to the state courts. People v. Onofrio,
65 Cal. App. (2d) 584, 151 P. (2d) 158 (1944); People v. Barnhart, 66 Cal. App. (2d)
714, 153 P. (2d) 214 (1944); People v. Vertlieb, 22 Cal. (2d) 193, 137 P. (2d) 437
(1943); People v. Kelley, 22 Cal. (2d) 169, 137 P. (2d) 1 (1943).
25 The Supreme Court had before it the same issue (applicability of §605 to state
courts) in 1949, when it affirmed by an equally divided bench (4-4) the holding in
People v. Stemmer, 298 N.Y. 728, 83 N.E. (2d) 141 (1948). Stemmer v. New York,
336 U.S. 963, 69 S.Ct. 936 (1949). In accordance with Supreme Court practice, no
opinion was filed, so that the factors motivating the individual justices in that case are
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Court skirted the constitutional issue which had intrigued cornmentators, 26 i.e., the existence of congressional power to enact rules of evidence binding on the state courts. In view of Congress' previous
reluctance to adopt any sort of wiretapping legislation, it is questionable
whether the issue thus by-passed in the opinion will arise in the near
future.
Although the question of congressional power in this area has been
rendered temporarily moot, the problem will lurk in the background
should Congress some day become indignant at abuse of wiretapping by
state police and attempt to outlaw the use of such evidence in state
courts. Before the Schwartz case law review writers were in general
accord that Congress does have the necessary power, if section 605
were to be held applicable to state courts.27 Any constitutional issue
of federal-state relationships naturally involves complicated questions
of policy and the balancing of local and national interests. However,
it would seem that control of telephone communications, especially in
view of the decision in the Weiss case,28 is a sufficiently compelling
objective of federal concern to warrant supersedure by Congress, should
it attempt such an exercise of the commerce power in the future.
Support for this proposition might be found in other areas in which
Congress has passed laws, under various constitutionally granted
powers, which have been held to regulate to some extent the rules of
evidence in state courts. Thus, under the full faith and credit clause,
Congress has enacted legislation prescribing certain rules of admissibility for public and judicial records in state courts.29 Under the tax
power, former federal laws excluding from evidence documents not
bearing a revenue stamp have been held to apply in state courts30
(although the weight of authority is contra31 ). Section 25(a)(9) of
the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that no testimony of the bankrupt
not ascertainable. This affirmance was not cited in Schwartz v. State, 344 U.S. 199, 73
S.Ct. 232 (1952), although reference was made to the decision of the New York Court
of Appeals (also reported without opinion).
26 E.g., 33 CoRN. L.Q. 73 at 78 (1947); 37 Ju.. L. R:sv. 99 at 108, n. 23 (1942);
40 J. CmM. L. 476 (1950); 3 MIAMI L. R:sv. 604 at 610 (1949); 34 ILL. L. R:sv. 758
at 760 (1940); 18 N.C. L. R:sv. 229 (1940). Cf. 25 MINN. L. R:sv. 382 (1941).

27Ibid.
2s

United States v. Weiss, 308 U.S. 321, 60 S.Ct. 269 (1939).
For judicial records, 62 Stat. L. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1738;
nonjudicial records, 62 Stat. L. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1739. The
same point may be made as to other sections of title 28, e.g., §1740.
so Chartiers & Robinson Turnpike Co. v. McNamara, 72 Pa. 278 (1872); Muscatine
v. Stememan, 30 Iowa 526 (1870).
31 See 1 WIGMORll, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §205, n. 2 (1940); 18 N.C. L. R:sv. 229 at
230, n. 6 (1940).
29

1954]

COMMENTS

435

"shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding,"
has been held applicable to the state courts.32 And, in accordance with
former Treasury Department regulations, Internal Revenue agents
could not be compelled by state courts to testify as to certain matters. 33
There is, of course, a strong states'-rights argument in opposition to
this view.
The opinion in the Schwartz case eliminated the touchy constitutional problem on the fairly solid ground that Congress had manifested no intention to make section 605 applicable to the states. As
its meaning sifts down to the state police systems, however, the opinion
may well be one additional factor in making more attractive the use,
and eventual abuse,34 of wiretapping in the fight against crime. This
might have the long-run result of arousing protest against invasion of
the individual's privacy to the point where Congress or the state legislatures will find it desirable to respond with remedial legislation. Indeed, the experience in New York, where police tapping authorized by
court order is permitted, has shown that wiretapping easily lends itself
to abuse. 35 During the 1952 legislative session several bills curbing
the present scope of legal wiretapping passed one of the two houses of
the state legislature. 36

v:

32 People
Lay, 193 Mich. 17, 159 N.W. 299 (1916); People v. Elliott, 123 Misc.
602, 206 N.Y.S. 54 (1924). See Clark v. State, 68 Fla. 433, 67 S. 135 (1914); State v.
Singleton, 85 Ohio App. 245, 87 N.E. (2d) 358 (1949).
33 Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 20 S.Ct. 701 (1900). Instances where Congress has regulated other aspects of procedure in state courts are cited in 34 ILL. L. RBv.
758 at 761-762 (1940).
34 The New York experiment, originated by constitutional amendment in 1938, authorizing limited wiretapping on the same basis applicable to the issuance of search war•
rants, has proved an initial disappointment to some, in terms of safeguarding individual
liberties. See Westin, "The Wire Tapping Problem," 52 CoL. L. RBv. 165 at 192-197
(1952). As to the inefficiency of the system, see news report of testimony by Harry Gross,
famed Brooklyn gambler, who stated that he was tipped off in advance as to every tap the
police placed in Brooklyn and New York. N.Y. T1MEs, March 25, 1952, p. 14:2. Gross
obtained his information through a policeman who knew a stenographer working for the
telephone company. See testimony of Miles F. McDonald, District Attorney of Kings
County, Brooklyn, N.Y., in Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, [House] Committee on
the Judiciary, on H.R. 408, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, and H.R. 5149, 83d Cong., 1st sess.,
p. 75 (1953).
35 See note 74 infra. And see Mellin, "I was a Wire Tapper," 222 SATORDAY EVE·
NING PosT, Sept. 10, 1949, p. 19 at 57; 52 CoL. L. RBv. 165 at 195 (1952).
36 The objectives of these bills were to permit judges to revoke their orders authorizing
legal tapping after examination of results of the tapping; to prohibit judges from isming,
and other persons from seeking, warrants for tapping outside the immediate jurisdiction;
and to ban the use of evidence obtained by illegal tapping in any criminal proceedings.
See N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1952, p. 22:5; Feb. 19, 1952, p. 19:2; March 8, 1952, p. 30:1;
March 14, 1952, p. 17:1.
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III. Congressional History Prior to 1934
Section 605 was the third of the three laws which Congress has
passed concerning wiretapping. The first piece of legislation was a
wartime measure enacted in 1918 at a time when the government was
operating the telephone system. This statute prohibited in broad terms
all wiretapping.37 The motivation behind the adoption of the statute
was apparently a congressional fear that the secrecy of governmental
activities was being jeopardized by tapping. 38 The statute by its own
terms expired when the government returned control of the telephone
system to its private owners, which occurred in July 1919.39 The
second federal statute was passed in the form of a rider to an appropriation bill in 1933, stating that "no part of this appropriation shall be
used for or in connection with 'wiretapping' to procure evidence of
violations of the National Prohibition Act." 40 This act followed unsuccessful attempts during the four years following the Olmstead case
(1929-1932) to get bills through Congress prohibiting tapping by
federal authorities. 41 The third and last federal law on the subject
was section 605. It thus appears that through 1934 all congressional
efforts in the wiretapping area were directed toward forbidding interception.

IV. Congressional History Since the Nardone Decision
Since the ruling in the first Nardone case in 1937 more than thirty
bills, resolutions, and joint resolutions dealing with .wiretapping have
been introduced in Congress.42 The nature of these bills has been the
opposite of the early series of proposals, for the most of the proposed
wiretapping legislation introduced in the 75th Congress through the
37 ''That whoever ••• shall, without authority and without the knowledge and consent
of the other users • . • tap any telegraph or telephone line • . ." would thereby commit a
federal offense. 40 Stat. L. 1017 (1918).
38 See "Wiretapping, Congress and. the Department of Justice,'' 9 INT. JuRID. AssN.
BUL. 97 at 101 (1941).
so 41 Stat. L. 157 (1919).
4o 47 Stat. L. 1381 (1933).
41 See note 22 supra.
42 In addition to those mentioned in the notes infra, see H.R. 9898, 75th Cong., 3d
sess. (1938); H.R. 4048, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949); H.J. Res. 553, 76th Cong., 3d
sess. (1940) (amended by H.J. Res. 571); H.J. Res. 41, 78th Cong., 1st sess. (1943); S.
595, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949) (reported back without the wiretapping provision); S.
4154, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950) (this bill, applying only to the District of Columbia,
was drafted on the model of the New York statute); H.R. 4404, 82d Cong., 1st sess.
(1951) (this bill prohibited the recording of telephone messages by federal employees). Note
also that the Senate Crime Investigating Committee recommended wiretap-authorizing
legislation. S. Rep. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 5 (1951).
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83d Congress has attempted in some limited manner to authorize
tapping by federal officials. Throughout this period the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and other federal agencies have carried on the
practice of intercepting messages in certain kinds of cases,43 with
varying interpretations of how much leeway section 605 allows federal
authorities outside of the well-settled ban against use of wiretapping
evidence in the courts.44 Most of the bills introduced in this period
have been drafted in the interests of national security and many have
been administration-sponsored. The bills proposed in the current
Congress are basically similar to those of previous years. 45
These thirty some proposals have not met with overwhelming success. Four of them, however, have passed at least one house. The
:6.rst of these came the closest to enactment, in 1938, when a bill designed to avoid the result of the :6.rst Nardone decision was approved in
both houses. 46 This proposal authorized wiretapping by federal employees if the head of any executive department or independent agency
reasonably believed that a felony against the United States was about
to be committed, prevention of which was under his supervision. Because of a minor variation in terms, which was not cured before adjournment, this bill never became law.47 In the following Congress,
the Senate, acting upon complaints that the wires of political leaders
were being tapped, passed a resolution directing an investigation into
such practices.48 Hearings held in accordance with this resolution
produced over 1,000 pages of testimony. 49 During this same session
of the 76th Congress, in 1940, a House joint resolution authorizing
the FBI to wiretap in certain situations in the interest of national de43 Of many examples which might be offered on this point, see as illustrative the
findings of Ryan, J., in United States v. Coplon, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 88 F. Supp. 921 at
924-926, and the reading of Bureau of Internal Revenue memoranda on recorded telephone
conversations in the House Ways and Means Committee investigation into the recent tax
scandals, N.Y. T1MEs, March 28, 1952, p. 12:3.
44 See criticisms of executive department handling of the problem expressed in the
articles cited in note 6 supra.
45 S. 832, H.R. 408, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953). See also
H.R. 5149, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), drafted by the Department of Justice.
46 S. 3756 (see S. Rep. No. 1790, H. Rep. No. 2656), 75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938).
Passage: Senate, 83 CoNG. lli;c. 7053 (1938); House, 83 CoNG. REc. 9453 (1938)
(debate at 9636). The bill also made it criminal to use communications facilities in the
commission of any felony against the United States.
47 The House added to the Senate version a paragraph prescribing a penalty for
unauthorized tapping or divulgence by federal employees.
48 S. Res. 224 (see also S. Res. 323, which was defeated), 76th Cong., 3d sess.
(1940). This resolution ripened into an investigation of wiretapping in Rhode Island,
Philadelphia, and New York.
49 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the [Senate] Committee on Interstate Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d sess., parts I and II (1940), 77th Cong., 1st sess., part ill (1941).
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fense passed the House but died in the Senate.50 The mounting
tension in international affairs in 1941 and the entrance of the United
States into war, together with subsequent allegations that the Pearl
Harbor disaster could have been avoided· if wiretapping by federal
authorities had been permitted,51 stimulated a B.ock of bills and resolutions during the 77th Congress.52 In the 1941 hearings on these proposals, the proponents were generally personnel from the Justice Department and the opponents were generally persons representing various civil rights and labor groups. 53 In June 1941, a House bill came up
for a vote but was defeated. 54 In the following year, however, a joint
resolution authorizing tapping by the FBI and the intelligence units
of the armed forces in investigations of suspected sabotage, treason,
seditious conspiracy, espionage, and violation of the neutrality laws,
passed the House;55 but again the bill died in the Senate. No B.oor
action was ever taken on any of the -bills proposed since that time.
The content of these thirty legislative proposals has not varied a
great deal from bill to bill. (1) As to the persons authorized to intercept messages, the bill referred to above which -passed both houses (in
slightly different form) was, oddly enough, one of the most far-reaching
proposals, in that it permitted tapping upon the issuance of a certificate
by the head of any executive department or independent agency. Later
bills specifically limited the agencies whose employees were permitted
to tap (generally restricted to the FBI and the intelligence units of the
armed forces 56 ) , although other bills gave authorization to "any inH.J. Res. 571 (see H. Rep. No. 2574 and H. Res. 537), 76th Cong., 3d sess. (1940).
the 77th Cong., 1st sess., Senator Truman vigorously defended Senator Wheeler,
chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee (to which most wiretapping bills were
referred) against criticisms on this point. See 88 CoNG. REc. 947 (1942).
52 S. Res. 97, H.R. 2266, H.R. 3099, H.R. 4228, H.R. 6919 (related problem), H.J.
Res. 273, H.J. Res. 283, H.J. Res. 304, H.J. Res. 310, H. Res. 222, H. Res. 487 (procedural), 77th Cong., 1st and 2d sess. (1941-1942).
53 Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1, [House] Committee on the Judiciary, on
H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941). After the United States entered
the war, representatives of both of these groups voiced approval of some restricted governmental tapping necessary for prosecution of the war. See letters of Phillip Murray, president
of the C.I.O., and the American Civil Liberties Union, in Hearings on H.J. Res. 283, 77th
Cong., 2d sess., p. 13 (1942).
54 H.R. 4228, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941), defeated by a 154-147 vote, 87 CoNG.
REc. 5793 (1941).
55 H.J. Res. 310, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942); passed House, 88 CoNG. REc. 4602
(1942).
56 E.g., H.R. 4228, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941); H.J. Res. 273, H.J. Res. 283, H.J.
Res. 304, H.J. Res. 310, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942) (H.J. Res. 273 included the
intelligence unit of the State Department also); S. 595, H.R. 3563, H.R. 4124, 81st Cong.,
1st sess. (1949); H.R. 406, H.R. 479, H.R. 1947, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951); S. 832,
H.R. 408, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953).
50

51 In
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vestigatorial agency forming a part of [any executive] department,"57
to "any person employed in the investigation, detection, or prevention
of offenses against the United States,"58 to "departments and agencies
designated by the President,"59 and to any "law-enforcement officer." 60
(2) Most of the bills have required that some official permission operate
as a condition precedent to authorized tapping. Some of the early bills
gave such responsibility to the head of the particular department or
agency, while most have vested this function wholly or partly in the
attorney general. One early proposal required governmental tappers
to obtain permission from the judge of any United States or state court
or a United States commissioner.61 Some bills in the most recent
Congresses have required, in addition to supervision by the attorney
general, permission granted by a federal judge.62 (3) The crimes
which are considered to be of such import as to legitimatize governmental tapping have varied somewhat. Originally the offenses included in the proposals were violations of "any criminal law of the
United States,"63 but this was cut down in one bill to any federal
"felony," 04 and in another to federal felonies "relating to th~ national
defense." 65 The eventual practice became one of listing the specific
offenses. This began with kidnapping, extortion, espionage, and sabotage, but today the category usually consists of sabotage, treason, seditious conspiracy, espionage, violations of the act requiring registration
of agents of foreign principals, violations of the act requiring registration of organizations carrying on certain activities, and, in some bills,
violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 66 One bill included
"offenses punishable by death." ( 4) Certain other aspects have been
dealt with in some of the proposals. For example, interception itself
(as opposed to the conjunctive "intercept and divulge") would be
illegal unless in accordace with statutory authorization, or else divulgence would be singled out as the forbidden conduct. Section 605
would be specifically amended, or tapping authorizations would be
57H.R. 2266, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941).
58 H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941).
59 S. 2833, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948). This bill covered only communications of
or to foreign governments.
60 H.R. 3644, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949).
61 H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1949).
62 The £rst of these was H.R. 3563, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949).
63 S. 3756, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938).
64 H.R. 2266, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941).
65 H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941).
66 E.g., H.R. 1947, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951). The three specific statutes referred
to may be found at 52 Stat. L. 631 (1938), 54 Stat. L. 1201 (1940), and 60 Stat. L. 755
(1946).
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made "without regard to Section 605." Evidence obtained by interception would be admissible in criminal and civil proceedings to which
the United States is a party, or else the information would be made
admissible in criminal actions only. Unauthorized possession of tapping equipment would be declared unlawful. Interception, by negative
implication, would be permissible if authorized by one of the parties to
the communication.67 Tapping would be permitted "in the conduct
of investigations involving the safety of human life." Tapping of the
wires of foreign governments would be allowed. Most of the bills have
proposed effective sanctions for compliance with their terms, with the
penalty for unauthorized or abusive wiretapping in contravention of
the law generally $10,000 and two years imprisonment or both. None
of the bills have purported to deal with evidence in the state courts.
The common thread running through these measures which have
been presented to Congress in the past :fifteen years, with the exception
of several resolutions directing investigations into certain specific instances of alleged wiretapping,68 has been the desire on the part of the
sponsors to obtain congressional sanction of limited governmental
tapping, generally in the name of national security. In none of the
proposals has there appeared the apprehension which motivated the
anti-wiretapping bills thrown into the hopper before 1934, and which
prompted Congress to adopt the 1933 appropriation rider forbidding
federal funds to be used for wiretapping purposes in enforcement of
prohibition laws. It should be noted that the draftsmen of the more
recent proposals have taken the care to define in fairly broad terms the
word "person" which has caused so much difficulty in interpreting
section 605.69 Also of interest is a provision in recent proposed legislation which successfully avoids one of the major problems of section
605, in that it expressly outlaws interception alone, as distinguished
from interception plus divulgence, unless authorized by the act. 70
67 See, in this connection, the interesting difference in view in the opinions of Judges
Clark and Learned Hand in United States v. Polakoff, (2d Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 888,
as to the meaning of the terms "sender" and "interception" in §605 when one party to a
conversation has consented to a recording. These radio terms were included in the Radio
Act from which §605 came, which perhaps helps to explain why application to wiretapping,
at least in the case of the word "sender," is so difficult of interpretation.
68 H.R. 359, 75th Cong., 2d sess. (1937); S. Res. 224, 76th Cong., 3d sess. (1940).
69 H.R. 408, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), is typical: "Sec. 9. For purposes of this
Act the term 'person' shall include any individual, partnership, association, business trust,
corporation, or any organized group of persons, whether incorporated or not."
70 "No person, other than those authorized pursuant to this Act shall intercept, listen
in on, or record telephone, telegraph, cable, radio, or any other similar message or communication, unless transmitted for the use of the general public or authorized by one of
the parties to such message or communication, or his employment as a part of the message
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However, it is doubtful that any of these measures were drafted with a
conscious intention to provide a workable wiretapping law applicable
to all persons, including state officials as well as federal employees.
The extent to which state law permits limited tapping has not been
dealt with in the bills. In view of the holding in the Schwartz case,
any contemplated statute establishing a comprehensive wiretapping law
binding on state officers should be explicit in expressing legislative intention to include such persons.

V. Conclusions
Wiretapping always has been an exceedingly controversial subject.
Certain facets of tapping have often been discussed in the committee
rooms and on the Hoor in Washington. In answer to demands made
by administrators for limited authorization to tap, the critics find their
most persuasive weapon in the ringing warning of Justice Brandeis:
"And it is also immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law
enforcement. Experience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are·
beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel
invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding." 71
Despite this Hag of caution, it is understandable why, during recent
years of constant international tension, demands for some authorized
wiretapping in the interests of national security have continued; the
climate prevailing in earlier periods has changed. 72 Limitations in the
present law on wiretapping have hamstrung the federal government
in its efforts to bring to punishment persons guilty of serious crimes
against the United States. 73
or communication system requires such action." H.R. 408, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953).
Despite this all-inclusive language, it is questionable whether this section would be construed by the courts in such a way as to reach a result contrary to the Schwartz case.
71 Dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 at 479, 48 S.Ct.
564 (1928).
72 "The committee would hesitate to allow wires or short wave messages to be tapped
in times of normalcy. We are, however, in a national emergency. Some sacrifices must be
made. Some rights have to be yielded." H. Rep. No. 2574 (accompanying H.J. Res.
571), 76th Cong., 3d sess., p. 2 (1940).
73 Attorney General Brownell has stated publicly that the Justice Department has
evidence against "several people who have betrayed the United States," but cannot legally
prosecute them because of the ban on wiretap evidence. N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1953, p.
10:4. Typifying the difficulties faced by the government are the results in the Judith
Coplon cases. Coplon v. United States, (2d Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 629; Coplon v.
United States, (D.C. Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 749.
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The reluctance of many to acquiesce in the demands for legalized
tapping, unless thoroughly reliable safeguards are provided at the same
time, may largely be traced to a fear that governmental tapping, although
designed with the good intention to ferret out disloyal offenders,
will be one more efficient instrument in the gradual invasion by the
state of the individual's ·privacy. In addition, the probability that
governmental interception of communications, even though narrowly
confined and strictly regulated, will have the contagious effect of
spreading to others the desire to use this effective but somewhat unethical means of obtaining information has no doubt played an important role in obstructing passage of any federal wiretapping legislation
since 1934.
.
Congress will be confronted with many considerations of policy
and practice, whether its next attempt to enact a wiretapping statute is
wide or narrow in scope. At present, two competing ideas dominate
the scene: the need and desire of the government for tapping authorization in certain pin-pointed areas of crime against the nation, and the
need and desire of the public for realistic protection against all unauthorized or abusive tapping. 74 These two ideas could.be harmonized
in a single statute.75 Any such statute, however, should emerge as the
product of intense congressional scrutiny of all aspects of wiretapping;
74 It should be anticipated that abuse may some day How from permitted use. E.g.,
police in New York occasionally have used wiretapping methods for improper purposes.
"We found in the course of our investigation in the Gross case ••. that police officers
without any instruction were buying their own wiretapping equipment. They would sit on
a telephone such as a coin booth near a baseball park or near a race track, and when they
heard people call up to make a bet they would forward that to another plainclothes
detective, who would then go and shake that bookmaker down. But that was all unauthorized tapping." Testimony of Miles F. McDonald, District Attorney of Kings County,
Brooklyn, N.Y., in Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, [House] Committee on the
Judiciary, on H.R. 408, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, and H.R. 5149, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 86
(1953).
75 Cf. discussion of Congressman Keating, chairman of the subcommittee, and William
P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General of the United States, in 1953 hearings, id. at 39:
"Mn. K:eATING: How do you feel about the imposition of penalties for unauthorized
interception of communications?
MR. RooEns: ••• The difficulty now is that the law is so nebulous that it's very
difficult to obtain successful prosecutions under it....
I do think, though, that if we can avoid tying it up here we'd prefer it....
. . . if we had a clear-cut law, we certainly would proceed against wiretappers.
MR. KEATING: It would seem to me that it would be appropriate to deal with this
problem in a single piece of legislation. • • • The purpose in mind, I believe, of the authors
of all these bills is definitely two-fold:
(I) To lay down the narrow class of cases in which this wiretapping will be permitted and the very definite procedures which must be followed to obtain permission; and
(2) On the other hand, to say, after those lines have been laid down, anybody that
steps outside those bounds is going to face stiff and severe penalties.
And I think it would facilitate the passage of the legislation to have both of those
problems at a single time, regardless of the language of any particular bills before us."

1954]

COMI\1ENTS

443

in recent years, and especially in the 1953 hearings on the subject,
much the heavier accent seems to have been placed upon the immediate
goal-authorization of governmental tapping. The likelihood that
Congress will consider only the limited objective of governmental
tapping was probably strengthened by developments in the November
1953 investigation into the so-called "Harry Dexter White case," in
which Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., repeated earlier requests to make admissible wiretap evidence in cases involving violations
of the espionage laws.76 Although the recognized desirability of such
authorization is great, it will be unfortunate if the first federal wiretapping law in approximately twenty years is hastily considered legislation dictated by the temper of the times and enacted without effective
complementary safeguards.
Many facts essential to intelligent formulation of legislative policy
have not been completely brought to light in congressional hearings.
The hearings held three days in the summer of 1953 before a subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary77 were enlightening, but technically this committee did not have authority to consider amendment of section 605.78 Thus it seems fair to conclude that
not all the ramifications of a revamped congressional position on wiretapping were examined. For example, the problem of whether the
federal government should affirmatively attempt to regulate interception
of communications at the state and private level, neglected to a great
extent by Congress in recent years, did not receive extensive treatment.
Not until the decision in the Schwartz case was the issue determined
whether Congress already had dealt with wiretapping in state legal
systems; this may explain the unconcern of some who might otherwise
have sought legislative limitation of abusive tapping by state operators.
Although the issue of the Schwartz case has become a dead letter as a
matter of judicial determination, it persists as an object of congressional
concern.
A new wiretap law based op inadequate study might well raise a host
of problems as confusing as those which have been litigated under
section 605. That Congress has sufficient power to enact effective
76 Testimony before [Senate] Internal Security Subcommittee, November 17, 1953.
Reported in N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1953, p. 22:2. And see note 73 supra.
77 Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, [House] Committee on the Judiciary, on H.R.
408, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, and H.R. 5149, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953).
78 Properly the concern of the [House] Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The five bills introduced in the 83d Congress, 1st sess. (1953) would permit
governmental tapping "notwithstanding" or "without regard to the limitations contained
in" §605.
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legislation seems sure; that it has the desire and patience to do so is a
much different matter. Commentators have urged that Congress fill
the gaping breaches in wiretapping law, and have offered specific
legislative proposals.79 It is to be hoped that Congress will discard the
limited type of study of proposed laws on wiretapping which has
marked legislative history in the past decade and a half, and will instead
attempt a penetrative inquiry into the possibilities of a comprehensive
overhauling of the rather mysterious section 605. 80 The appearance in
the 1953 hearings of the district attorney of Kings County, New York,
in which he explained in precise detail the mechanics and effectiveness
of New York procedure for obtaining court orders authorizing state
· wiretapping, represents a firm step in the right direction.
If such a full-scale inquiry were to yield a statutory law drafted in
clear terms and with well-defined scope, the public as well as the executive and judicial branches of the government would no longer be
obliged to scrape to find a nonexistent congressional intent. Then for
the first time it would be possible to point to a proclaimed legislative
policy on the many phases of wiretapping, and the courts would no
longer have to throw up their hands in dealing with nebulous legislation.
Richard W. Pogue, S.Ed.
79 Westin,

''The Wire Tapping Problem," 52

CoL.

L. REv. 165 (1952); 2 STAN.

L. R:sv. 744 (1950).
so A proposed scope schedule for congressional investigation was offered by Helfeld, "A
Study of Justice Department Policies on Wiretapping," 9 LAw. GmLD R:sv. 57 at 68-69
(1949).

